Ohio "Brain Suction" Law, Struck By Federal Court,
Differs Greatly from Partial-Birth Abortion Laws


WASHINGTON (Dec. 5) - - A widely publicized November 18 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, striking down an Ohio law placing restrictions on so-called "dilation and extraction" abortions, dealt with a statute very different from the laws restricting partial-birth abortions that have been enacted by numerous states.

By a 2-to-1 vote, a panel of the appeals court struck down a provision of Ohio's 1995 law restricting what it calls "dilation and extraction" abortions. "Dilation and extraction" is a term coined by Ohio abortionist Dr. Martin Haskell for an abortion method in which he removes a baby's brain while the baby is still partly within the womb, before delivering the intact cadaver.

The Ohio law defines a "dilation and extraction" abortion as "the termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain.... [The term] does not include either the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion."

Dr. Haskell challenged the law, and in late 1995 he won a judgment from a federal district court that the definition was ambiguous and could be interpreted to ban not only the procedure that Haskell uses, which involves the removal of the baby's body mostly intact, but also "dilation and evacuation" (D&E) abortion, which is a commonplace method of second-trimester abortion in which the baby is removed piece by piece from the womb.

The appeals panel agreed that the Ohio definition could be so construed, and held that such a restriction on the D&E method would constitute an "undue burden" on the "right" to obtain second-trimester abortions, thereby violating the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992).

In its report on the Sixth Circuit ruling, The New York Times [Nov. 19] noted that "there was at least a suggestion in the opinion . . . that a precisely worded ban on a particular abortion method, even before fetal viability, might be acceptable if it defined the procedure with more care and avoided the vagueness problem the appeals court identified in the Ohio statute."

Not a Partial-Birth Law

"From the national perspective, the most important thing to understand is that the Ohio law is not a partial-birth abortion law," said NRLC Legislative Director Douglas Johnson. "This ruling should have little effect on court cases in other states which involve genuine partial-birth abortion laws, or on any legal challenges to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, if we are able to override President Clinton's veto."

Even the lawyer representing Dr. Haskell, Alphonse Gerhardstein, told the Associated Press that he doubts that the Supreme Court would agree to review the case because the Ohio law is too different from other states' laws to set any meaningful example for the rest of the nation.

The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act would prohibit"partial-birth abortion," defined entirely differently from the Ohio law's "dilation and extraction." The federal bill prohibits "an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery."

In its ruling, the Sixth Circuit panel said explicitly, "We express no opinion on the constitutionality of this definition [the federal bill's definition of partial-birth abortion] or the federal legislation."

The Ohio law prohibits the "brain suction" process, whether or not the baby is already dead before the brain removal is conducted, and whether or not the baby has been partly delivered from the womb. In contrast, the federal partial-birth abortion ban would apply to all cases in which the baby is partly delivered alive before being killed, whether or not this is followed by removal of the brain.

Sixteen states have enacted laws with definitions of partial-birth abortion that are similar or identical to the federal bill. A number of these laws have been blocked by lower-court orders, but none has been reviewed by any federal court of appeals.

These differences between the Ohio law and laws that define partial-birth abortion are of potentially great legal consequence.

"The Sixth Circuit used - - or misused - - Supreme Court precedents that apply to laws that attempt to regulate the killing of unborn babies," explained NRLC's Johnson. "But the federal bill would specifically ban killing babies who are already partly born, which poses a substantially different legal question. The partial-birth abortion method is used mostly to kill babies at 20 to 24 weeks of development - - 4-1/2 to 5-1/2 months - - who would be legally regarded as live births if the babies' heads were delivered."

Johnson noted that in its official reports on the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee argued that because the baby is partly delivered alive, the U.S. Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey rulings simply do not apply to the procedure of partial-birth abortion, as defined in the federal bill. Numerous law professors have expressed agreement with this argument.

However, the argument that the government at least has the right to protect a partly born child is irrelevant to the Ohio law, because the Ohio law makes no reference to partial birth or to the location of the baby.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit's ruling does not control the outcome of cases involving laws enacted by other states that restrict partial-birth abortion. No federal court has yet directly considered the issue of the constitutional status of partly born human beings.

Besides invalidating the "dilation and extraction" restriction, the Sixth Circuit panel also struck down another section of the Ohio statute restricting abortions after "viability," except if "necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman." The restriction becomes effective at the beginning of the mother's 22nd week of pregnancy, unless the abortionist determines through medical testing that the baby is not "viable."

By a 2-1 vote, the appeals court said that this restriction was unconstitutional because it does not contain an exception to allow post-viability abortions "where a woman is faced with the risk of severe psychological or emotional injury which may be irreversible."

Judge Cornelia Kennedy and Judge Bailey Brown, both appointed by Democratic President Jimmy Carter, voted to strike down both the "dilation and extraction" and post-viability restrictions. In dissent, Judge Danny Boggs, appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan, argued that both the "dilation and extraction" and post-viability restrictions were constitutional.

Further Information


For further discussion of the procedures that are covered by bills to ban partial-birth abortion, please see "Call It Partial-Birth Abortion - - It's the Law" [June 19 NRL News, page 6].

An in-depth legal exposition of the legal status of partly born human beings, in the form of a friend-of-the-court brief filed by NRLC in defense of Michigan's partial-birth abortion ban, is available on request from NRLC, Federal Legislative Office, 419-Seventh Street, Northwest, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20004.