PET Scans Show Patients in Minimally
Conscious State Feel Pain
Part Two of Two
When I read a story this morning with the headline, "Patients in Minimally
Conscious State May Still Feel Pain: These brain-damaged individuals show
signs of awareness, unlike vegetative state," I thought of two things. In
reverse order, they were#1. The
distinction drawn between patients supposedly in a minimally conscious state
(MCS) and those said to be in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is nowhere
near as clear cut and easy to parse as the article that appeared in places
like MedPage Today suggests. (More about that below.) And
#2. An e-mail exchange I had several
years ago with a very prominent bioethicist, sparked by the case of Terri
Schindler Schiavo, but not about her. He passionately made the case that if
severely brain-damaged patients can experience pain, their "artificially
administered nutrition and hydration "ought to be stopped. More bluntly,
they ought to be dehydrated and starved to death.
Back to #1. According to MedPage Today, "Patients in a minimally conscious
state appear to have brain activity that indicates they can feel pain,
researchers here [Liege, Belgium] reported.
PET scans detected activation of
regions of the brain known collectively as the pain matrix that was no
different than the activity observed in control patients [i.e., healthy
patients]. ... The findings they concluded, 'might be objective evidence of
a potential pain perception capacity in patients [in a minimally conscious
state], which supports the idea that these patients need analgesic
treatment.'"
Following electrical stimulation,
researchers compared brain activity in five MCS patients, 15 PVS patients ,
and 15 healthy people. The researchers focused on brain areas responsible
for pain sensation.
"The MCS patients showed the same
level of activity in these areas as healthy people and significantly more
activity than PVS patients," according to MedPage Today. Let's think about
this for a second.
As noted, the distinctions between
minimally conscious and persistent vegetative are blurry and inherently
subjective. The PVS label is a notoriously imprecise diagnosis applied to
individuals who have, typically, emerged from a coma so as to have
sleep-wake cycles, but have been believed to demonstrate no conscious
awareness, only reflexive activity.
And as we have reported in this space
and National Right to Life News, in 2006 a study that used functional
magnetic resonance imaging found that a patient diagnosed to be in a PVS had
brain activity "indistinguishable from that of healthy volunteers."
Studies like this new one out of
Belgium--and especially summaries of their results--demand the ability to
read between the lines. For example, after stating that it "was generally
agreed" that PVS patients "were unlikely to perceive pain," the very next
sentence in the MedPage Today story is "although PET was widely available
and easy to use, its utility was limited. A better option for assessing pain
in an individual patient, he [Javier Provencio, M.D.] said, would be
functional MRI. Dr. [Melanie] Baly and colleagues noted that PET did not
'enable us to identify reliably activation maps in individual patients.
Functional MRI can tackle this problem because many more scans would be
acquired per patient; these studies are ongoing.'"
That could easily be read to mean that
the lower tech PET [Positron emission tomography] scans are not nearly as
reliable as functional MRIs which may well show more activity in "brain
areas responsible for pain sensation" in PVS patients than suspected.
The stark alternatives for what we do
with this knowledge were illustrated in my back and forth with the
bioethicist. His default position always is death. Yours and mine is always
life.
Part One |