H.R. 3962 could be used to
establish standards that would
result in the denial of
lifesaving medical care based
upon degree of disability, age,
or "quality of life"
Part Three of Three
Editor's note. The following was
part of a letter sent by NRLC to
members of the House after the
Stupak amendment was adopted,
but before the vote on final
passage.
[A]s we have advised in previous
communications, NRLC has very
serious concerns about aspects
of H.R. 3962 as they relate to
involuntary denial of lifesaving
medical treatment. We will
continue to work to correct
provisions that we find
objectionable in this area, both
in the health care legislation
that will come before the
Senate, and in any conference
committee on health care
legislation. We reserve the
right to score the roll call
vote on the conference report,
or on any Senate-passed bill, if
these concerns are not
adequately resolved. Moreover,
NRLC would certainly score the
roll call on any conference
report that did not contain the
Stupak-Pitts language.
Since its inception, the
pro-life movement has been as
concerned with protecting the
lives of older people and people
with disabilities from
euthanasia, including the
involuntary denial of treatment,
food, and fluids necessary to
prevent death, as it has been
dedicated to protecting unborn
children from abortion. H.R.
3962 contains provisions that
threaten these lives.
(Documentation of and further
details concerning the points
made below are available at
http://www.nrlc.org/HealthCareRationing/HouseLegislation.html.)
For both those eligible to
participate in the insurance
exchange and older Americans
covered by Medicare, H.R. 3962
limits their right to spend
their own money to save their
own lives.
Section 104, as modified by
the Managers' Amendment,
empowers the Commissioner of the
Health Insurance Exchange to
exclude from the exchange plans
offered by health insurance
issuers whom the Commissioner
considers have "excessive or
unjustified premium increases."
This essentially grants to one
federal official the discretion
to impose price controls on
insurance premiums. While no one
wants to pay more for anything,
including health care, being
prohibited from paying what may
be needed to obtain unrationed
health insurance amounts to
government-imposed health care
rationing.
Under current law, Medicare
recipients have the legal
option, if they choose, of
adding their own money on top of
the government contribution in
order to obtain "private
fee-for-service" Medicare
Advantage plans that can use the
additional premiums to ensure
access by paying providers
higher rates and to avoid
"managed care" limitations on
treatments and tests. Presently,
the Medicare statute prevents
the government from
second-guessing or imposing
limits on the premiums for
private fee-for-service plans,
allowing beneficiaries to
balance cost, benefit, and
affordability in making their
own decisions whether to
purchase such plans. Section
1175 amends that provision so as
to empower the federal
government to exclude from
competing in Medicare Advantage
those plans whose bids it does
not like. The consequence is to
give the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) the
discretion to deny older
Americans the choice of plans
whose premiums CMS deems too
high. This amounts to the
imposition of price controls,
thus limiting what older
Americans are permitted to spend
for health insurance. Again,
being prohibited from paying
what may be needed to obtain
unrationed health insurance
amounts to government-imposed
health care rationing.
In addition, Section 1165
effectively ends the ability of
unions and employers to offer
such plans nationwide or on
anything other than a local
basis. Since a given company's
or industry's retirees are
likely to be spread around the
country, this greatly
undermines, if it does not
effectively eliminate, the
ability of unions and business
to offer to their retirees plans
that allow them to add their own
money to the government Medicare
contribution in order to reduce
the prospect of being denied
needed treatment.
Provisions in H.R. 3962 could be
used to establish standards that
would result in the denial of
lifesaving medical care based
upon degree of disability, age,
or "quality of life."
Section 2401 creates a "Center
for Quality Improvement" which
is to promote "best practices"
in health care by doing four
things: 1) identify existing
best practices, 2) develop new
ones, 3) evaluate both, and 4)
implement them.
It contains a provision that
states that the Center "shall
not develop quality-adjusted
life year measures or any other
methodologies that can be used
to deny benefits to a
beneficiary against the
beneficiary's wishes on the
basis of the beneficiary's age,
life expectancy, present or
predicted disability, or
expected quality of life."
(Emphasis added.) As far as this
goes, it provides a critically
important protection against the
widespread emphasis in the
comparative effectiveness
scholarly literature on the use
of discriminatory criteria in
standards of medical practice,
an approach unapologetically
employed in Great Britain by
that nation's National Institute
for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE).
Unfortunately, this protection
applies only to one of the
Center's four missions the
development of "best practices."
It leaves a gaping loophole with
regard to the Center's
identification, evaluation, and
implementation of existing "best
practices."
Anything like this
anti-discriminatory protective
language is missing entirely
from Section 1401, which creates
a Center for Comparative
Effectiveness Research, and from
Section 1159's provisions
commissioning the Institute of
Medicine to develop new Medicare
reimbursement standards to
create incentives for "high
value care" which will be
implemented automatically unless
vetoed by Congress.
Advance care planning provisions
could be used to "nudge"
patients toward accepting denial
of treatment as a means of cost
control, and despite apparent
prohibitions, could include
assisted suicide.
Section 240 requires health
insurers participating in the
exchange to provide
beneficiaries with the option to
establish advance directives and
disseminate information about
"end-of-life" planning, while
Section 1233 reimburses Medicare
providers for "advance care
planning consultations" with
senior citizens. While the
National Right to Life Committee
recognizes the legal right to
execute advance directives and
promotes its own version, the
"Will to Live," the author and
blogger Lee Siegel, a strong
advocate of universal health
care coverage, points out an
important danger in these
provisions:
For those of us who believe that
the absence of universal health
care is America's burning shame,
the spectacle of opposition to
Obama's health-care plan is
Alice-in-Wonderland bewildering
and also enraging but on one
point the plan's critics are
absolutely correct. One of the
key ideas under end-of-life care
is morally revolting.
[Section 1233] . . . offers to
pay once every five years for a
voluntary, not mandatory,
consultation with a doctor, who
will not blatantly tell the
patient how to end his or her
life sooner, but will explain to
the patient the set of options
available at the end of life,
including living wills,
palliative care and hospice,
life sustaining treatment, and
all aspects of advance care
planning, including, presumably,
the decision to end one's life.
The shading in of human
particulars is what makes this
so unsettling. A doctor guided
by a panel of experts who have
decided that some treatments are
futile will, in subtle ways,
advance that point of view. Cass
Sunstein [who is the Obama
Administration's regulatory
czar] calls this "nudging,"
which he characterizes as using
various types of reinforcement
techniques to "nudge" people's
behavior in one direction or
another. An elderly or sick
person would be especially
vulnerable to the sophisticated
nudging of an authority figure
like a doctor. Bad enough for
such people who are lucky enough
to be supported by family and
friends. But what about the
dying person who is all alone in
the world and who has only the
"consultant" to turn to and rely
on? The heartlessness of such a
scene is chilling.
What gives weight to Siegel's
concerns is the focus by
advocates on the money such
"nudging" is expected to save.
For example, Holly Prigerson of
Boston's Dana Farber Cancer
Institute has been quoted as
saying, "We refer to the
end-of-life discussion as the
multimillion-dollar conversation
because it is associated with
shifting costs away from
expensive . . . care like being
on a ventilator in an ICU, to
less costly comfort care
.."
Moreover, these provisions could
lead to federal facilitation of
direct killing. While both
sections state that they do not
authorize "promotion" of
"suicide" or "assisted suicide,"
providing information about its
availability in states where it
is legal could well be described
as not "promoting" it, only
making patients aware of legal
options. Section 240 states that
it does not require health
insurers participating in the
exchange to inform beneficiaries
about advance directives that
include assisted suicide in
states where it is legal.
However, Section 1233 contains
no express limitation on
including advance directives
that direct assisted suicide as
part of the federally funded
"advance care planning
consultations" with Medicare
patients.
What is more, a section in the
statutes of both Oregon and
Washington State pertaining to
what most people recognize as
the legalization of assisted
suicide explicitly provides that
what these state laws authorize
"shall not, for any purpose,
constitute suicide, assisted
suicide, mercy killing or
homicide, under the law." In
light of this, it is troubling
that the final drafters of
Sections 240 and 1233 rejected
the inclusion of a federal
definition of "suicide" and
"assisted suicide" based the
existing federal Assisted
Suicide Funding Restriction Act,
opening the possibility that
provision of information about
the option of obtaining lethal
prescriptions in these states
would be construed not to
constitute the excluded
provision of information about
"suicide" or "assisted suicide."
Thank you for your consideration
of NRLC's objections to these
provisions of H.R. 3962.
Part One
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