Royal College of Ob-GYN
"Fetal Awareness" Report Does Nothing to
Rebut Conclusion Unborn Can Experience Pain at 20 Weeks
Part One of Two
By Paul Ranalli, MD FRCPC
Editor's note. This is
a very important article. Be sure to read it carefully and pass
it along to all your contacts. Part
Two is important in a different way. It talks about a
remarkable workshop at NRLC 2010. Over at National Right to Life
News Today (www.nationalrighttolifenews.org),
there is a great news about a win in Missouri and pro-life
legislative aggressiveness in general. Please send all of your
comments to
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Paul Ranalli |
What are we to make of the
typical headline associated with the recently released "Fetal
Awareness" paper issued by Britain's Royal College of Obstetrics
and Gynecologists (RCOG)--that the human fetus cannot feel pain
until 24 weeks' gestation? Pro-abortionists and almost the
entire media establishment on both sides of the Atlantic insist
it rebuts the case that the unborn experiences pain no later
than the 20th week. In fact, the report does nothing of the
sort, as a closer examination makes clear.
By way of preface, it is
important to remind ourselves that the RCOG report
unintentionally makes hash of a 2005 pro-abortion "study" in the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) which
purported to show that the unborn could not feel pain until the
29th week. (See below.) But the demarcation of 24 weeks still
manages to avoid the abundant scientific evidence supporting
fetal pain perception at 20 weeks' gestation.
How? By minimizing the
research and opinion of the leading experts in the field; by
including seriously inaccurate analogies; and by introducing the
highly misleading concept of an unconscious fetal state where
the child is supposedly "insensitive" to severe pain.
The flaws in the RCOG
report derive not just from a misreading of the science. Logical
inconsistencies and a disturbing philosophy combine to leave the
impression that the intent of the RCOG's Working Party is not to
offer a scientific update--as it was charged with doing by the
British government's Ministry of State for Public Health--but
rather a partisan exercise in damage control. A side benefit is
that the report offers a kind of how-to guide to reassure the
troops in the abortion clinics who are facing some increasingly
uncomfortable questions every day from pregnant women and,
possibly, from their own consciences.
In one sense, there is
nothing really new here. The RCOG came to the same conclusion in
its first report on the subject, in 1997. As the governing body
of Britain's obstetricians and gynecologists, including
abortionists, it seemed somewhat convenient at the time that its
interpretation of the science coincided with the latest
gestational age at which most abortions are performed in the
United Kingdom. Actually, the RCOG concluded that the fetus does
not likely feel pain until 26 weeks' gestation, but to be on the
safe side, it moved its recommendation back to 24 weeks, because
of the inherent uncertainty in dating a pregnancy. So in now
declaring 24 weeks as the earliest juncture at which the unborn
can feel pain, this latest report actually moves the RCOG's
consensus opinion back two weeks earlier in pregnancy than in
1997.
While the RCOG is moving
in the right direction, it is still off. Based on our current
understanding of the anatomical, hormonal, and behavioral
development of the human fetus, the scientifically correct
moment is 20 weeks.
The second point, as noted
above, is that in one stroke, this report invalidates the
infamous August 24, 2005, article in JAMA. "Fetal Pain: A
Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence" purported
to show that the fetus cannot feel pain until 29 weeks. This
absurd conclusion effectively ignored the pain felt by premature
infants who are born and survive from 23 weeks onward, to say
nothing of unborn children in the womb from 20 weeks, the real
pain-capable threshold. Of course, the JAMA authors included
committed abortion advocates, as was revealed at the time by
Marie McCullough of the Philadelphia Inquirer. Now, they have
even lost the backup of their own fellow abortionists in the
United Kingdom, who have rendered the American study's
conclusion irrelevant by 5 weeks, back to the 24-week mark. Even
more embarrassing for the profession in the U.S., the American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) recently issued a
blithe denial, without qualification of gestational age, of the
entire concept of fetal pain.
Three Categories of
Problems
The problems with the new
RCOG Working Party report can be grouped into three categories:
scientific, logical, and philosophical.
1. Scientific. The authors
correctly note that between 12-18 weeks, pain-bearing nerve
fibers begin to rise up from a deep structure (the thalamus,
which gathers pain inputs from the body below) toward the
surface of the brain. The brain's surface is called the cerebral
cortex, and contains the one billion brain cells that create our
consciousness and awareness, and issues commands for our
voluntary actions. The cortex is also referred to as the
"plate," and the region just below it the "subplate zone." This
zone is present only in the fetus, and gradually disappears
around 34 weeks, as the overlying cortical plate matures.
Ascending pain fibers reach this subplate zone by 16-20 weeks,
then make their final connections with the surface from 20-24
weeks.
The report appears to
ignore emerging evidence that the subplate is not just a
transient feature of the maturing fetal brain, but increasingly
functions as a highly active zone of neuronal activity, creating
a fetal awareness of incoming neuronal signals, including pain.
While the pain pathway is initially crude, it is not absent.
By not acknowledging the
latest research on the importance of the complexity of fetal
subplate function, the authors are able to resist moving their
chosen date of 24 weeks to a point earlier in fetal development.
This is but one example of the disturbing manner in which the
panel turned their back on inconvenient research and
interpretations by leading scientists in the field, such as
American fetal pain expert Dr. K.J. (Sunny) Anand, who point to
20 weeks as the point by which the unborn can experience pain.
The authors also introduce
the concept that, even if pain signals reach the fetal cerebral
cortex at an early stage, it doesn't matter, because the fetus
is not awake: "It has been proposed that arguments around fetal
pain can be resolved by the fact that the fetus never enters a
state of wakefulness in utero." This belief was not mentioned at
all in the 1997 report, has not been a topic on the radar screen
of fetal pain discussions in recent years, and appears to come
out of left field. It is hard to avoid the impression that the
authors view this new proposal as a kind of scientific trump
card.
The evidence, such as it
is, appears largely based on observations of fetal lambs in the
womb. Brain-wave patterns are sleep-like, including both rapid
eye movement (REM) sleep and the deeper non-REM sleep. To test
their hypothesis that these sleeping lambs cannot feel pain,
they "stressed" them by temporarily depriving them of the normal
oxygen concentration in their blood, a maneuver known as hypoxic
stress. While doing so, they observed little movement or
distress in the fetal lambs. Their conclusion? The human fetus
likely cannot feel pain in this dream state, even if all the
pain wiring is hooked up.
Does this make any sense?
To answer this, you don't need to be a neuroscientist, you only
need to step back and consider your own experience of sleep.
While non-REM sleep can be deep, REM sleep (in which dreams take
place) is quite light, as anyone knows when they waken from a
dream "with a start" into instant awareness. Sleep is not coma,
and the lighter stages of sleep even less so.
For the authors to imply
that this sleeplike state obviates a potential for fetal pain is
like saying that we shouldn't worry about the suffering
experienced by a victim in light sleep who is suddenly attacked
and stabbed repeatedly. It should be obvious that, after a
split-second delay, the pain will be all too palpable.
Also, the "stress" of
diminishing the fetal lamb's oxygen can hardly be equated to an
abortion, as the authors seem to guiltily acknowledge: "While
the lack of fetal movement during anoxic stress in sheep may not
be the same as the response to acute surgical tissue damage in
humans ... ." Or, for that matter, the horrific tissue
destruction of a second-trimester abortion.
Nevertheless, despite the
weakness of this observation, and the caveats buried within the
text, the authors parade this point in both their conclusion and
in a scripted section at the end of the report designed to
reassure women, entitled "Questions some women ask." For
example, "Will the baby suffer/feel pain?"
"No, the fetus does not
experience pain. In addition, increasing evidence suggests that
the fetus never enters a state of wakefulness inside the womb."
2. Logical. The authors go
on to endorse the "it's not pain, it's a reflex" argument, which
is both common and pivotal to the insistence that the unborn
cannot feel pain until at least the 24th week, if not much
later. They correctly note that reflexive movements away from a
painful stimulus arise from deeper levels (spine, thalamus)
without the need for voluntary awareness and reaction. But while
reflexive response begins early in fetal development, and
awareness of pain later, the persistence of reflex reactions (in
adulthood as well) does not, by itself, deny conscious suffering
from pain. Far from it. Again, consider your own experience.
When you accidently place
your hand on red-hot stove burner, you quickly pull your hand
away (the reflex) before the searing wave of pain hits you
(conscious awareness). By their argument, seeing the initial
reflexive movement somehow denies the second response:
"Behavioral reactions can be mediated at a very low level in the
brain and are not, therefore, evidence for experienced emotion
or sentience." But of course such "sentience" is in no way
excluded either.
They try to support their
position by pointing to the intact reflexes in children born
with tragically severe brain malformations, including
anencephaly, where the child has a rudimentary brain structure,
but fails to develop the entire cerebral cortex. They also use
the example of pain reflexes observed in children with the rare
brain malformation called lyssencephaly, in which the brain
maturation arrests at a point similar to a fetus of 22-24 weeks
gestation. But this is not the same thing at all and as such is
deeply misleading. In lyssencephaly, there is a lack of
connections between deeper structures and the cerebral cortex,
and abnormalities of another part of the pain system, the limbic
system.
By contrast the unborn
child who is developing without problems is rich in such
connections at this stage. These analogies are scientifically
invalid, and, more than anything, highlight the weakness of this
argument.
The authors also try to
dampen enthusiasm about our ability to witness "normal" baby
behaviors, such as yawning, visible on exquisitely clear 4D
ultrasound images. They point out that yawning is a protective
lung reflex that maintains proper lung inflation: "While this
protective reflex is unnecessary in the womb where oxygen is
delivered by the umbilicus, it will be necessary soon after
birth, and therefore the neural connections that mediate it need
to be fully functional well in advance of birth."
While this is all true,
the authors fail to see the irony: this same argument can be
turned against them and made to support the position that there
is an early and gradual development of the pain system. Just as
yawning prepares the unborn baby's lungs to be ready for the
sudden plunge into outside air, so too the fetal pain system
needs early development and readiness in the womb to prepare for
the moment of separation from the mother. Once outside and no
longer protected by the comforting environment of the mother's
uterus, the newborn baby's ability to feel pain and distress,
and then draw the mother's attention by crying, is absolutely
critical for his survival and healthy growth.
3. Philosophical. Consider
this quote from the RCOG report: "The fact that the cortex can
receive and process sensory inputs from 24 weeks is only the
beginning of the story and does not necessarily mean that the
fetus is aware of pain or know it is in pain. It is only after
birth, when the development, organisation and reorganisation of
the cortex occurs in relation to the action and reaction of the
neonate [newborn] and infant to a world of meaning and symbols,
that the cortex can be assumed to have mature features ... .
Thus, there is good evidence for claiming that the cortex is
necessary for pain experience but not sufficient." This kind of
analysis--that pain is only genuine when someone "knows it is in
pain"--bears the unmistakable imprint of Stuart Derbyshire, one
of the paper's authors. Dr. Derbyshire, a Birmingham
psychologist, is a tireless and prolific denier of fetal pain
based on just this type of analysis. As opposed to the hard
science of embryology and physiology of fetal pain, Derbyshire
favors a highly intellectualized approach to pain--that there
can be no meaningful pain experience without the ability to
interpret the pain in the context of higher cognitive awareness
and prior experience. Its logical extension would find one
ignoring the heartrending cries of a baby because she is too
simple and inexperienced to fully appreciate pain.
However, this altogether
misses the reality that higher-level cognitive functioning is
not at all necessary for the reception and impact of such a
primal experience as pain. To their credit, the paper's authors
seem somewhat uncomfortable with the intellectual line of
argument. They note that official international definitions of
pain "tend towards a view of pain as being a constituent part of
higher cognitive function. There is disquiet in denying a rawer,
more primitive form of pain or suffering that the fetus, neonate
and many animals might experience." But, they seem to then say,
not to worry. They set aside these unpleasant thoughts with this
bit of hand-waving: "One possible solution is to recognize that
the newborn infant might be said to feel pain, whereas only the
older infant can experience that they are in pain and explicitly
share their condition with others as an acknowledged fact of
being."
The inclusion as a panel
author of Derbyshire gives away the clear intent of the whole
RCOG exercise: to minimize and deny the emerging reality of
fetal pain awareness at 20 weeks or even earlier (when many
second-trimester abortions are performed in the UK and
elsewhere). In an era of increasingly aware and informed
patients, this is becoming a problem for them.
Similarly--and quite
strangely--the RCOG has minimized input from true fetal pain
experts such as Dr. Anand and UK experts such as Drs. Nicholas
Fisk and Vivette Glover. Dr. Glover has previously expressed a
belief that fetal pain may be present as far back as 17 weeks'
gestation. This is a rather important omission.
To its credit the original
1997 RCOG report, while erroneous in setting 26 weeks as the age
of fetal pain detection (with the recommendation to use 24
weeks, to be on the safe side) at least raised worrisome
questions about the subject, and expressed a sense that doctors
should err on the side of caution.
The new report, on the
other hand, seems determined to err on the side of callousness.
"Currently there is no immediately obvious way of resolving
these arguments empirically," the authors candidly admit, but in
discussions of the need for specific anaesthesia for potential
fetal suffering, they wave these concerns away.
The entire exercise
suggests that abortionists on both sides of the Atlantic are
thrashing around in trying to deal with the emerging evidence of
fetal pain, which has resulted in a political report designed to
seal off concern about fetal pain in abortion. The RCOG report
is not a new contribution to science as much as a form of
political cover for the horrific practice of late abortion, and
perhaps a shaky attempt to reassure those who have to perform
it. The giveaway comes on the last page of the report, with
these sad words: "Consideration needs to be given to the
education and support of clinical staff working in this
difficult area."
Paul Ranalli, M.D., FRCPC,
is a neurologist at the University of Toronto.
RCOG Report Analysis
Highlights
A new report by Royal
College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (RCOG)--the governing
body of Britain's obstetricians and gynecologists--is seriously
flawed. Its main conclusions are reached by misinterpreting
existing science and ignoring the latest research in human brain
development.
-
Fetal pain experts
consistently point to 20 weeks' gestational age, and
possibly earlier, as the point by which the unborn are
capable of experiencing pain. Several of these experts were
ignored or minimized in the RCOG report.
-
While the RCOG currently
claims that the unborn cannot experience pain until 24 weeks
(down from 26 weeks in its prior report), abortion
practitioners and their governing bodies are all over the
map. A 2005 American abortionist study claimed 29 weeks as
the earliest point, while a recent statement from the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology denied fetal
pain capability altogether.
-
The RCOG report further
implies the fetus is unlikely to feel pain because it is
never enters a state of wakefulness in the womb. In fact,
the authors have attempted to interpret the light sleep
observed in fetal animals as meaning the human fetus cannot
feel the horrific pain of a second-trimester abortion.
Unfortunately for the unborn victims of abortion, light
sleep is not coma.
-
The RCOG report's authors
endorse a long-argued pro-abortion claim that the reflex
withdrawal from a painful stimulus does not imply the fetus
can "feel" pain, as the reflex occurs at a primitive,
subconscious level. Yet, as adults, we all still possess the
quick reflexive withdrawal from a painful stimulus, and
immediately afterward we feel the pain. Thus the observation
of a reflexive pain withdrawal does not deny the pain
experience. The question is, when does that pain experience
begin in fetal life? By focusing on the reflexive component
of pain, abortion advocates try to avoid that question, with
good reason. As the science steadily builds a case for fetal
pain capability at 20 weeks gestation or even earlier, this
type of deception is needed to shield the public from this
dreadful reality.
-
The panel included an
author who has long promoted the view that there can be no
meaningful pain experience without the ability to interpret
the pain in the context of higher cognitive awareness and
prior experience. The RCOG appears to indulge this view. If
taken to its logical conclusion, this would imply we should
not care about pain in newborn babies, a viewpoint that has
been discredited for over 30 years, and is now considered
barbaric.
-
The RCOG report's authors
are unable to avoid creating the appearance of partisan
pro-abortion bias throughout the report, best revealed in
the concluding reassurance they attempt to give to abortion
clinic workers, who work every day in what is
euphemistically termed a "difficult" area.
Dr. Ranalli is a
Neurologist at the University of Toronto.
Part Two |